Reply to Hal's comment
Dear Hal,
You wish to replace the state with a system on private law. It won't work. Who is going to enforce the law? Even if you found a group of people who agrees to these laws, someone has to enforce them.
Let's say you abolish the state. Everybody lives under private laws. One day, you walk along the street. Someone bonks you on the head with a bat and robs you. Who is going to arrest the assailant? There is no longer any police or jail.
Or say you have signed a contract with someone. He reneges on the contract and runs away with your money. Who is going to force him to deliver the goods you paid for, failing which you may seize his property.
Today, the state has courts which have the power to force him to pay up. The state has a monopoly of violence. If he does not pay up, the police will get him. Or send the guy who bonked you on the head to jail.
So someone still has to administer the law, hire police and build jails. Let's assume that you have managed to hire police, build jails and set up courts to enforce your privately agreed laws. Say you live in a city of 10,000,000 people with a thousand systems of private law. You will need 1,000 different jails, police forces, courts etc. And our neighbor might be living under a different laws from you!
What if something is legal in one system but illegal in another? Say under one private legal system, its legal to sell heroin but illegal in another. A buys heroin from B. In A's law books, its legal. But B (who is trying to cheat A) lives under another set of laws which is illegal. B runs away after getting money from B. How will A get his money back? A contract is enforcable only if it is legal. Which court should A go to to get redress?
So people living in the same geographic area must have only one law and you end up with a state.
A system of private law won't work. You still end up with a state and then you need a mechanism to choose the leaders of that state. So we are back with the question of how to set up a government.
I noted your comments on my proposed reforms. Remember, nothing lasts forever. No system is going to be perfect. I simply looked at Venice which lasted for more than a thousand years under their system. But eventually, it broke down. They failed because one group - the aristocrats usurped all the power. The British Parliamentary system is failing because one group - the people usurped all the power.
My proposal is an attempt to restore the balance of power between three elements for a long lasting and succesful government - the people, the elite and the executive who must manage the country.
Hal's reply:
Hi Ohmyrus,
These are essential objections, which my proposed scheme needs to address. I should have done so in my reply to your essay, but it would have been too long!
Taking your points in order.
“Who is going to enforce the law?
Judges, investigators, and police. As they do now, but privately, rather than under state control.
A legal code will have to be accompanied by a realistic enforcement machinery to be taken seriously, for two reasons.
First, so that potential members know that they can force other members to observe the code’s terms – not to assault fellow members, and to stick to their contracts. A legal code without an effective enforcement mechanism won’t attract members.
Second, to give third parties the confidence to deal with you. Remember, this is one of the main reasons for joining such a code. It tells third parties that it is safe to deal with you, that you will not assault them or break contracts. This applies even, or especially, if you are rich and powerful, and even if there were no other members.
Without an effective enforcement mechanism, third parties will not feel safe to deal with members of a code. And members won’t be able to trade. They will be lonely and poor!
Think of it as like getting a college degree. Sure, it would be nice if your college would relax its enforcement procedure – exams – and give out easy degrees. Some do (see my spam folder). But word soon gets around. Third parties – employers – discount those pieces of paper and render it a waste of time and money getting them. Decent students avoid college like this.
The same thing will happen to a legal code which does not enforce its rules.
“One day, you walk along the street. Someone bonks you on the head with a bat and robs you. Who is going to arrest the assailant?”
Police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, jailers and bailiffs.
Suppose the assailant is another member of your code. The police and investigators follow the criminal procedure prescribed by the code. The prosecutors and judges, following the code’s rules of evidence, try the case and sentence the assailant. The jailers jail him or extract compensation from him. (I leave the economics of such a system to a separate discussion, but refer you to http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/legan/legan026.pdf for some interesting thoughts)
Suppose the assailant belongs to no legal code. Your code may state that he should be afforded the same procedure or protection as if he were a member of the code. More likely, your code will state that the benefit of your code can only be claimed by other members of that code or a recognized code. Except, perhaps, for a core of residual standards that it would demean members to transgress against even the most worthless characters. I.e. mutual rights and obligations. In which case you, or your code’s enforcers, can do more or less what you can get away with to the assailant. Thus putting the member of no legal code in a vulnerable position.
“Or say you have signed a contract with someone. He reneges on the contract and runs away with your money. Who is going to force him to deliver the goods you paid for, failing which you may seize his property.”
Similar to the crime situation. Lawyers, judges, and bailiffs force him to comply. Suppose the renegade is not a member of any legal code – he has no protection. Should your legal code afford him protection against you? It is difficult to see why. So, at its crudest, you are free to find him and force the goods out of him.
However, it is unlikely to get that far. You would probably not contract with him in the first place if he didn’t belong to a legal code with an effective enforcement mechanism. Would you, as an American citizen, contract with a bankrupt in, say, Somalia? If you did, you would probably ask for goods upfront, to avoid feeling a fool if he ran off with your money?
Your question illustrates why people would need to belong to a code in order to enter into contracts. Third parties will require this partly for their own peace of mind, and partly because their banks insist on it. It would be a condition of any mortgage, or company loan, that the borrower only enter into contracts with members of an approved code.
“Say you live in a city of 10,000,000 people with a thousand systems of private law. You will need 1,000 different jails, police forces, courts etc.”
In reality, it’s unlikely you will have 1,000 systems within one city. But if you do, they are likely to be highly compatible.
The main reason for joining will be to be able to deal with other people. So the main criteria for choosing a system will be its ability to talk to other systems.
Let’s say there is a minor difference, e.g. smoking in restaurants, between your system and mine. If they are the same in all other respects, then it is very easy for them to coexist. It may be tedious for us to go out for a meal, but it will be straightforward for our two systems to share a high level of recognition on contractual and criminal matters.
As for jail, police, and courts services, why does a code has to provide them in house? A good simile is the PC or car industry, where the component makers may be fewer than the brands. E.g. two or three different legal systems use the same police provider, perhaps assessing the precise level of service that their customers will value most.
I would guess that your local police authority contracts a fair amount of labour from agencies – administrators, ‘phone operators, trainers. This would extend to some front-line duties were it not for employment and union restrictions. I would also guess that these agencies offer their services to private security firms as well.
This is where I think my system would have a substantial advantage over the current state monopoly, because the mixture of competition and private incentive would, as usual, lead to greater efficiency, and a much finer awareness of what the public value. It always does.
“And our neighbor might be living under a different laws from you!”
I think you’re right, but I don’t see this as a problem. I suspect that you are falling into the leftwing, statist trap of thinking that the fact that people need something (in this case the ability to live and deal with others) somehow disables them from providing it for themselves.
People will select a legal code because it enables them to live and deal with a large number of people, particularly those nearby. So they’re likely to join a system which is the same as, or compatible with, the system that others use locally. In the same way that VHS, IBM and Microsoft became dominant – compatibility!
Differences will be minimised. What’s the point of them – to be perverse and antisocial? Some people are like that, but let them! They aren’t many.
Let’s look at this from an abnormally pessimistic point of view. Suppose the people on your side of town, the Montagues, belong to one system, and those on the other side, the Capulets, belong to another. And suppose neither system recognizes the other, even though they say substantially the same thing about contracts.
You will find it inconvenient not to be able to buy from or sell to Capulets. Suppose the Montague code authority recognizes this and unilaterally decides to extend Montague contractual law protection to people who belong to the Capulet system.
The Capulet system may respond in kind, in which case all well and good. But suppose it doesn’t, out of bloody mindedness. Montagues are at an advantage, because whilst you can expect Capulets to trust your word, Capulets cannot expect you to trust theirs.
So, if you buy a car advertised for sale by a Capulet, you can tell them you will write a cheque once you have received safe delivery and a test-drive. But the Capulet can’t expect you to make a cash purchase in advance of delivery.
But the advantage really shows if there are 3 systems: if the Montague system recognises Capulets and Friar-Lawrences, but the Capulets and Friar-Lawrences only recognise their own. In that case, Montagues can deal with everyone in town, but Capulets and Friar-Lawrences can only deal with themselves.
Now extend that effect across 1,000 systems, as per your example. Which position would you prefer: being able to trade with everyone in town, or being able to trade with 0.1% of people?
Each system will have the incentive to maximise commonality with other systems, in order to maximise its members’ opportunities to deal with as many other people as possible on as many levels as possible.
Every salesman knows the importance of rapport!
“Say under one private legal system, its legal to sell heroin but illegal in another. A buys heroin from B. In A's law books, its legal. But B (who is trying to cheat A) lives under another set of laws which is illegal. B runs away after getting money from B. How will A get his money back? A contract is enforcable only if it is legal. Which court should A go to to get redress?”
I think you’re reaching a little here, my friend! The situation is not much different from the way it is today (although, I would expect a system of private law to be more law-abiding). Heroin sales are already illegal, and contracts to sell it are unenforceable. How does A get his money back under today’s system? Presumably he asks for cash upfront, threatens violence, or hopes he is dealing with an honest user!
I think the issue you’re getting at is ‘levels of compatibility’. Two systems which don’t recognise each other’s rules about heroin sales can still recognise each other’s rules about contracts and tort. So an Amsterdam dope-dealer who visits London can’t expect Londoners to treat his trade as just another contract! And the Londoner who visits Amsterdam has to be prepared for drug use on the streets.
In your example, A’s system, the one that tolerates heroin sales, would be well advised unilaterally to state that members of system A observe contract law on heroin sales in respect of any purchaser whatever his or her code. That way members of system A can sell heroin to anyone, because those third parties know that members of system A must deal honestly with them on heroin sales. But members of system B might find that when they get back home, system B sends them to jail!
As an aside, the drug-dealing situation offers an interesting insight into how a system of private criminal law will work. It suggests that, contrary to perception, private legal code societies will be conservative. I suspect that members of private legal codes will be restrictive of drug-use, because the choice is not simply whether or not you want to use drugs. The choice will be whether you want the freedom to use drugs at the expense of living in an area where other people use them, or whether one is prepared to give up the freedom to use drugs in return for living in an area where other people don’t use drugs.
People who don’t use drugs will probably prefer not to have others around them using drugs, because of the problems that tend to accompany drug use. So non-users will opt for a code that prohibits drug use. Which means that for people who want the freedom to use drugs, the price of that freedom is living amongst people who actively use them. For the vast majority, the attraction of living in an area free from drug-use and its attendant problems is likely to outweigh the value of feeling free to use drugs if you decide you want to. I find this poetic, and appropriately undermining of sham leftwing libertarianism.
“So people living in the same geographic area must have only one law and you end up with a state.”
I agree with you up to a point. People living in the same locality will have a powerful incentive to adopt similar, and compatible, systems. For the reasons I’ve given.
But the tendency of birds of a feather to flock together is nothing new! It happens today. If anything, this tendency is exaggerated under social democracy, whose welfare states create such dangerous levels of segregation.
People like shared values because it creates trust, law-abiding, and solidarity. I don’t think shared values automatically amount to a state. The crucial difference is that you are not free to opt out of the state’s rules. Once the vote is counted, and the government in place, you obey its rules, whatever you voted.
If you were free to opt out, then tax wouldn’t exist because tax isn’t tax if it is paid voluntarily.
“I noted your comments on my proposed reforms. Remember, nothing lasts forever. No system is going to be perfect.”
You’re right! I am slightly embarrassed by what people may take to be the utopian nature of my suggestion. Utopia means gulags.
“I simply looked at Venice which lasted for more than a thousand years under their system. But eventually, it broke down. They failed because one group - the aristocrats usurped all the power. The British Parliamentary system is failing because one group - the people usurped all the power.”
Actually, I hope I was not too hard on your reformed democracy. I think it stacks up pretty well, particularly the part about sellable votes. I think they would concentrate power in the hands of those with the money and the sense of responsibility to pursue it. My hunch is that it would attract the rich and paternalistic – Soros, Gates, Buffett – rather than the rich and unscrupulous.
However, the point which I seek to play as my trump card is the unlikelihood of your system coming into play. Welfare democracy is not going to be reformed. It is going to collapse.
I see no politicians or voters willing even to question the welfare state. The shelf-life of such European finance ministers who have queried the affordability of welfare programmes has been short. Witness too the European elites’ limpet-like attitude to discredited multiculturalism, foreign debt, and popular dependence. Still chirping like crickets in the face of the calamitous implications.
The number of people wishing to reform democracy is few indeed, as I’m sure you realise, and turkeys will vote for Christmas before dependent populations and elites vote to reform the welfare out of welfare democracy.
It is not an exaggeration to say that, at least over here, democracy means state provision. I think they would prefer to collapse democracy rather than let democracy turn off the welfare drip-feed.
Mark Steyn has called the “perfect storm” facing Europe, and I don’t see how European democracy can survive it.
In which case, it is not a question of reforming democracy if democracy ceases to exist. The realistic hope is to provide a system people can use once democracy has gone down, to avoid the descent into the war zone.
So my proposal, is more realistic than it seems at first. People will need stability more than ever, but the state won’t be there to provide it. If there’s a mechanism for them to provide it for themselves I think they will use it. What is the alternative – the poverty, chaos, and violence?
Well, Ohmyrus, I’ve enjoyed trying to reply! I hope I have given satisfactory answers and haven’t descended to sarcasm. I would be interested to continue, and also to hear the views of your colleague Fjordman who appears to share my doubts about the future of democracy.
My guess is that you will still not be entirely convinced, so fire away!
Hal
posted by Ohmyrus @ 11:33 PM
6 Comments:
Hal, I think the primary problem with your scenario is that any such arrangements would inevitably lead to some lower form of governance in that someone would have to oversee the administration of services (police, judges, etc) and collect any form of citizen contribution (money/tax) to run things. (Even condo complexes have boards which can get very political.) As your society grew, so would the board or committee who is charged with overseeing it as their responsibilities are joined with other boards or committees in the common interest of being efficient with "taxes".
The society you describe is basically what we have now minus a centralized government to enforce it, or more likely each individual State minus the Federal government - different sets of laws that are compatible.
I tried to think outside the box to see if I was missing something but all roads lead to forms of someone taking the responsibilities of governance and admin.
Hi My Left Nut,
Thanks for your comments.
Quite the handle you have, if I may say!
I think overall, you are confusing a fee for services with taxation. They are very different, in principle and detail, because one is voluntary and the other isn’t.
I think that a lot of your queries (‘being efficient with “taxes”’; someone to ‘oversee the administration’) flow from this basic misunderstanding. And that this leads you to say that my proposal would be “basically what we have now minus a centralized government to enforce it”, and that “all roads lead to forms of someone taking the responsibilities of governance and admin”.
I hope I’m not being disrespectful, so let me take each of your points in order.
Your first, basic point, “that someone would have to oversee the administration of services (police, judges, etc)”.
First, I don’t think this would be the case. If the admin one competing code gets excessive, members can switch to another.
State organisations, however, use every form of ‘oversight committee’, ‘public consultation’, ‘investigatory commission’, ‘suggestions box’, as substitutes for the efficiency that competition would otherwise provide. That’s all you’ve got when contribution is compulsory, and competition is absent. So there is the potential, and the reality, of inefficiency or abuse. These consultation and oversight bodies offer a pretense that ‘something is being done’ about rising costs accompanying falling outputs.
E.g. the list of British Health Service efficiency monitoring bodies runs at over a page, and meanwhile a 2% increase in Health Service outputs has accompanied a 3¼ increase in British Health Service spending in the 11 years to 2008. Similarly with the BBC, and every other aspect of the civil service and welfare state.
On the other hand, I don’t need “someone to oversee the administration of” my supermarket, and I wouldn’t be interested anyway, because I can shop elsewhere.
This is the key to my proposal: the freedom not to join and leave make the system run efficiently because its operators have to compete. You may not agree with that, but you have to agree that it is a completely different form of discipline to the statist methods of trying “to oversee the administration”.
Second, I don’t think that condo boards and the like amount to a state. Whilst condos boards can get political (especially in fancy neighbourhoods where it’s a route to respectability!), there is a world of difference between that and a state.
If management fees get too high, purchasers probably won’t buy in, and residents will sell. Values will then decline. If they fall far enough some enterprising investor may buy a stake, replace the little Lenins, and turn a profit. At the least, board members will cost their residents money and become unpopular.
And you can avoid the problem altogether by buying a row-house!
Anyway, my proposed system won’t resort to the statist method of forcing everyone to pay for a ‘Condo Board Supervision Commission’ – how effective d’you think that’d be?!
Over here the state takes about 50% of the economy. How long do you think people will allow a their legal code to sting ‘em for that much before they vote with their feet?
Remember, the cost of joining a code wouldn’t be a tax, but a fee in exchange a service. If it’s expensive or inefficient, you join a competitor. You’re not interested in the cumbersome workings of “boards or committees in the common interest of being efficient with "taxes"”.
This is why I think you’re confusing my consensual system with a compulsory monopoly (i.e. statist) system based on taxation and oversight.
“The society you describe is basically what we have now minus a centralized government to enforce it, or more likely each individual State minus the Federal government - different sets of laws that are compatible.”
I’m sure where to begin with such a basic misunderstanding of my proposal, except to disagree as politely as I can in every respect.
It isn’t “basically what we have now minus a centralised government to enforce it”. First, because local government is still compulsory, and democracy doesn’t make it any less so – you can’t opt out. Second, because my proposal does include enforcement mechanisms (please see my most recent exchange with Ohmyrus on his main blog).
“I tried to think outside the box to see if I was missing something but all roads lead to forms of someone taking the responsibilities of governance and admin.”
What I think you’ve missed is the voluntary nature of the consensual system I’m suggesting. The key words are ‘private’, or “consensual”, i.e. non-state. If you don’t like it you don’t have to agree to it. You can find another, or none at all. But you risk being lonely, vulnerable and poor if you don’t sign up to one that enables other people to live and deal with you!
Perhaps you might like to reconsider the idea with that principle in mind. I think you will find that this puts it out of range of the “roads (that) lead to forms of someone taking the responsibilities of governance and admin”.
Anyway thanks again for your comments, and for giving me the opportunity to explain a little further!
Best wishes,
Hal
Hi Hal,
Thanks for responding to my comments. The “Left Nut” thing is the name of my blog and gets entered automatically on sign-in. My name is Rick. I am neither “left” nor a “nut”, although some may deem the latter debatable. As you say I hope I’m not being disrespectful in anything I address – although it seems this is an essential tag in this age of comment section flaming.
I understand the concept of what you are suggesting but I still see an inevitable path to some form of governance. Your blueprint seems like an entirely free market system and would only be possible with the full dissolution of existing governments and starting over. Ohmyrus’ suggestion is in line with reorganizing what we are currently involved in.
I do support free markets but your description seems like the equivalent of Amish Mennonites enclaves with the adoption of modern conveniences and free markets thrown in.
From Wiki: Amish lifestyle is dictated by the Ordnung (German, meaning: order), which differs slightly from community to community, and, within a community, from district to district. What is acceptable in one community may not be acceptable in another. No summary of Amish lifestyle and culture can be totally adequate, because there are few generalities that are true for all Amish. Groups may separate over matters such as the width of a hat-brim, the color of buggies, or various other issues.This sounds barebones similar to what you are suggesting on a grander scale with the main difference being that the Amish are still bound by laws originating from outside their community. They may be able to deal punishment to a thief but a murderer would be outside their jurisdiction.
I think when human nature and our tribal instincts of leader/follower mentality come into play (and they would) some will rise to a position of leadership while others will contribute less to decisions quite content to let others get their hands dirty. When that happens you will end up with classes which will divide the wants and needs of the citizens and create discord.
By your solution, those citizens opposing decisions or existing rules are free to leave which will result in different consensual systems catering to different classes of society as some may be able to afford and desire more luxurious amenities. The poorer consensual systems will likely collapse under the weight of maintaining or developing infrastructures which will lead to a welfare class (elderly, sick, disabled, etc) either being shunned or being taken care of by the more affluent. This creates the problem of how and who should pay to take care of them or who decides if they should be shipped off to the leper colony or accepted as a liability. It would also lead to exclusionary practices regarding who is or isn’t allowed in.
Setting up your society, or consensual system would require someone or some group to decide upon the rules under which that system would function. This would entail itemizing services that would be deemed essential (police, judges, firemen, etc) and the fees that would be applicable to the users. It is consensual (pay or leave) but it is a tax, maybe not in name and not enforced through coercion of confinement, but rather expulsion.
Then consider the costs that each service would incur to set up and then function. Police cars, jails, fire trucks, courts, and the upkeep. How will these be paid for? A lump sum off the top (tax)? If the initial members are to be charged with setting this up for their mutual benefit – then what of new members coming in and reaping the rewards of this great community without contributing? It’s building an apartment block and not charging rent – and you will end up with many seeking free rent.
While “consensual” in the sense of agreeing to the terms to join the group, as the group grows more rules, infrastructure and services will be required and growing the community will become the responsibility of the community members. If a small group (let’s say 5 people) within disagree with buying a new fire engine but the majority (95 people) want one will the minority be asked to leave for disagreeing with the majority, or will they be denied the service of the new truck if their house is burning down because they chose to not pay for it. If this split is fine within your community, then you will now have a situation to be managed regarding who does and does not receive certain services.
They are free to leave but will your system function as a democracy where new measures will be voted on? Does “majority rules” decide or does everyone have to agree?
I see the 13 colonies banding together as “united states” as being the path your society would end up on.
I love your premise that it is a “false assumption that only the state can provide and enforce those rules” but I don’t think your consensual scenario will work beyond conception because growth will open the door for politicking at every step beyond the basic premise and it is not workable to expect it to stay a fully consensual society without resorting to some form of governance, law enforcement and mandatory monetary contribution to the growth and maintenance of the society (or a tax by a different name).
I would have liked to spend more time on this but today is a busy day so I just rattled this off. I hope it made some sense and thanks for entertaining my opinion (also thanks to Ohmyrus for hosting this).
Rick
Hi Rick,
Thanks for your further reply!
Actually, I thought the handle rather catchy, although I have to wonder why people refer to the left one more often than the right one!
I think that, overall, you still tend to view my proposal as being another utopia. “Right lads! Let’s make a new state, only a better one this time, you know, without all the government interference!!” Hence what seems to me to be your circular argument that I’m proposing a state and, therefore, shouldn’t be surprised if it functions like a state.
Actually, it took me a while to work out why you have the trouble understanding my proposal, which isn’t rocket science. I think you say it won’t work because you dislike it, from a plain old Social Democratic point of view, seeing a bunch of services which should only be provided by the state.
Again, taking your comments in order.
“Your blueprint seems like an entirely free market system and would only be possible with the full dissolution of existing governments and starting over. Ohmyrus’ suggestion is in line with reorganizing what we are currently involved in.”
You’re right about the “free market system” bit, and “the full dissolution of existing governments”. But the unpalatable fact is that democracy is dissolving itself with no help from me, at least in Western Europe (I could go into more detail but, would go on too long!).
The upshot is that my solution is more realistic than Ohmyrus’, because you can’t “reorganise what we are currently involved in” if what we are involved in no longer exists.
“…your description seems like the equivalent of Amish Mennonites enclaves with the adoption of modern conveniences and free markets thrown in.”
Your reference to Amish Mennonites suggests to me that you think I want to create a bunch of small state authorities.
“the Ordnung … which differs slightly from community to community, and, within a community, from district to district. What is acceptable in one community may not be acceptable in another. … Groups may separate over matters such as the width of a hat-brim, the color of buggies, or various other issues.”
My system would be similar only in that members of one code could be free to leave and join another. Different in that different codes could still be compatible, and live and deal with each other.
Let’s say my code only allows narrow hat brims, and yours allows medium-wide. In my system we need not migrate to separate counties (“communities”). If our codes are the same in other respects, we can still live next door, and trade. If I start promenading in a medium-brimmed hat then you, or a fellow member of my narrow-brim code, can get me hauled before the magistrates.
But the Mennonites you refer to who, from my limited knowledge, live separately according to the various permutations of dress and laboursaving devices.
“I think when human nature and our tribal instincts of leader/follower mentality…”
I generally find wafting about human nature a substitute for effective debate. So, whilst I would like to pay you the courtesy of responding, I am too lazy to do so.
But if people are foolish enough to be influenced by “classes which will divide the wants and needs of the citizens and create discord”, then so be it. E.g. you can agitate for wide hat brims all you like, and if you succeed I may feel decidedly last-season, but its overall effect on the compatibility of our two legal codes will be insignificant. I can still buy your mangle, and you can still feel safe that I won’t steal your turnips.
“By your solution, those citizens opposing decisions or existing rules are free to leave which will result in different consensual systems catering to different classes of society as some may be able to afford and desire more luxurious amenities.”
You mean people may try to establish gated communities inaccessible to poor people? Now where has that happened before!
“The poorer consensual systems will likely collapse under the weight of maintaining or developing infrastructures”
Again, you think I am proposing separate states, with each one owning all the services which we now associate with a social democratic state. To remind you: I am not proposing a better state solution, I am proposing a no-state solution.
“which will lead to a welfare class (elderly, sick, disabled, etc) either being shunned or being taken care of by the more affluent.”
Well I’m sure this has never happened before! Again, you just don’t want to conceive of life without the state. I think you’re reciting the left wing line that without the welfare state, the streets will be clogged with the bodies of the poor. Again, I don’t get into that point here for a lack of space. But James Bartholomew’s well researched “The Welfare State We’re In” describes pretty well how people appeared to cope before the British welfare state.
“This creates the problem of how and who should pay to take care of them or who decides if they should be shipped off to the leper colony or accepted as a liability.”
Charities? Families? Neighbourhoods? Friendly Societies? Mutual organisations? Doctors donating time, as happened before the British NHS? The welfare state really got going in Britain about 60 years ago, but I think it’s been more than that years since Britain had a leper colony.
I suspect this is why you have trouble conceiving of life without the state – you have swallowed the idea that the sky will fall on our heads without the state to prop it up.
“Setting up your society, or consensual system would require someone or some group to decide upon the rules under which that system would function.”
Ah yes, the group deciding things on our behalf! Again, you seem to think that people can’t decide for themselves. In general, people can choose a system which enables other people to trust them so that people can live and deal together. You don’t want to conceive of life without the state deciding for us!
“This would entail itemizing services that would be deemed essential (police, judges, firemen, etc)”
Enough police and judges to enforce your system, so that people can trust you and deal with you. I imagine that, since fire spreads, most codes will require subscription to a reputable fire service!
‘Deemed’? Come on Rick – people can decide for themselves!
“It is consensual (pay or leave) but it is a tax, maybe not in name and not enforced through coercion of confinement, but rather expulsion.”
It isn’t a tax, any more than your car insurance – required by your current legal code – is a tax. It is a fee in return for a service, a service which you have to have if you don’t want a fine. Exactly the same thing can happen under my proposal.
“Then consider the costs that each service would incur to set up and then function. Police cars, jails, fire trucks, courts, and the upkeep. How will these be paid for? A lump sum off the top (tax)?”
By whatever method individual members prefer, and that code states. In reality, by individuals reaching into their pockets to pay for the service they subscribe to. Again, like your car insurance.
Again, you can’t get the need for the state out of your mind, or the idea that I’m proposing lots of mini statelets. There is no reason why the same police service, Courts service, or fire service should not serve members of different codes. See my reply to Ohmyrus on this point on the main blog page.
I think you think that if a code has, say, 100 members it must employ the full complement of policemen, judges, firemen, teachers and traffic wardens of a Western-style state, working exclusively for it. In the same way that British fire engines don’t trundle across the Channel to put out French fires!
Does each code have its own fire station, and own all the fire engines? What a lovely thought!
“If the initial members are to be charged with setting this up for their mutual benefit – then what of new members coming in and reaping the rewards of this great community without contributing?”
See my reply a couple of paragraphs up.
“While “consensual” in the sense of agreeing to the terms to join the group, as the group grows more rules, infrastructure and services will be required and growing the community will become the responsibility of the community members. If a small group (let’s say 5 people) within disagree with buying a new fire engine but the majority (95 people) want one will the minority be asked to leave for disagreeing with the majority, or will they be denied the service of the new truck if their house is burning down because they chose to not pay for it. If this split is fine within your community, then you will now have a situation to be managed regarding who does and does not receive certain services.”
I don’t go into this paragraph in any detail, except to say that it is obvious you think I am proposing a utopian little community (on an island somewhere?!) with its own state authority, only somehow… er, without a state authority because… well… but nicer.
Come on Rick, I find it hard to believe you can’t do better than this!
“They are free to leave but will your system function as a democracy where new measures will be voted on? Does “majority rules” decide or does everyone have to agree?”
Is it necessary for your supermarket to function as a democracy where new products will be voted on? Or your car insurer where new levels of cover will be voted on?
I guess it’s possible some codes will provide for votes like this, like mutualist organisations do. Some people enjoy that. Most of us prefer to buy our service and go away.
“I love your premise that it is a “false assumption that only the state can provide and enforce those rules” but I don’t think your consensual scenario will work beyond conception because growth will open the door for politicking at every step beyond the basic premise and it is not workable to expect it to stay a fully consensual society without resorting to some form of governance, law enforcement and mandatory monetary contribution to the growth and maintenance of the society (or a tax by a different name).”
I guess your reason for assuming that I am proposing another variation of the democratic state is what appears to be your belief that a lot of services can’t be provided privately. From your comments so far, the list includes: health care, care of the elderly, policemen, judges, and firemen, care of the disabled, care of lepers, and social integration.
The bottom line seems to be that, at heart, you like state provision, and can’t conceive of society functioning without a large chunk of it. I.e. you like the all-providing state and want it to continue. It’s not that you think my system won’t work, but that you don’t want it to!
To which my reply is, first that it can work, and second, that those state provided services are not going to be around much longer anyway, on this side of the Atlantic at least.
Best wishes,
Hal
Hi Hal,
Thanks for the lengthy reply which I took my time to ponder.
I think that the imposition of a code must coincide in a geographic area for which it applies. You can't have two or more codes for the same place.
You comment that "birds of feather flock together" is correct. Thus you end up with small territories with different codes which may be incompatible.
Let's say that you get a group of Muslims in one area of London or wherever you live. They wish to impose Shariah Law and all members agree to it.
As you may know Shariah Law calls for death of apostates. Let's say that another part of town allows for freedom of religious beliefs. Now one day someone from the Shariah part of town decides that he no longer wants to be Muslim. He flees to join the "free" part of town and agrees to live by their code.
Soon his former brethens demand that he be returned failing which its war. So codes or laws are necessary tied to a specific geographic area where its laws can be applied by force if necessary. If the "free" part wants to protect its codes, it needs to use violence. If the Shariah part of town wants to enforce its laws, it needs force too.
Soon you need a centralized authority to arrange for the defence of its territory where its legal code can prevail. You go back to the days when Ceaser invaded Britain where the country is divided between numerous tribes each holding a small bit of territory.
And each territory needs a centralized authority to arrange for its common defence and to enforce its laws within its borders. So you still need a government no matter how small the area is. So we are back to square one.
Hi Ohmyrus,
Thanks very much for your reply! And for taking the time to consider.
Overall, I think you share Rick’s twin errors that each code is exclusive and necessarily incompatible with another code, and that essential services can only be provided by the state authority. I get the impression that this is based on the assumption rather than reason.
“You can't have two or more codes for the same place.”
I disagree – please see my previous replies to Rick. What matters is that they are compatible. Compatible enough to allow the members to coexist, to live and deal together.
In the same way that you can have two or more types of car insurance policy, or payment card, in the same place. Their rules need not say precisely the same thing. But provided they enable other people to feel reasonably confident interacting and dealing with you, then the system works.
“Thus you end up with small territories with different codes which may be incompatible.”
You seem to be saying that populations which subscribe to basically incompatible codes, or sets of codes, will tend to live in different areas?
Yes I agree, and that the degree of separation will depend upon the degree of incompatibility between the sets of codes.
But the dividing line will be set by ownership rather than state sovereignty. If I own land and subscribe to a code, it can be said that that land comes within that type of code.
“Let's say that you get a group of Muslims in one area of London or wherever you live. They wish to impose Shariah Law and all members agree to it. As you may know Shariah Law calls for death of apostates. Let's say that another part of town allows for freedom of religious beliefs.”
I think you raise a fascinating, and very relevant example.
I agree that there is a deep and growing divide between the Islamic populations and ethnic European populations in Europe. This position is well documented, for example by the Cantle Report in 2002 which talked of “parallel lives” between these two populations in parts of northern England. Five years later Professor Cantle reported that the situation had got even worse. Please see my blog, especially the posts “Euro/Islam Divide – the Numbers”, and “Euro/Islam Divide – Why the Numbers Matter”.
However, we’re not talking about merely different codes here, but incompatible codes. It is unlikely that one code will offer its protection (i.e. force its members to observe the duties prescribed by the code) towards members of an incompatible code. Which means that members of one code are exposed if they live amongst members of another code, thus enhancing internal cohesiveness.
As an aside, you may also like to read “Self Government – Europe and Islam” on my blog, which basically proposes a more effective way of dealing with the problem of Islamic terrorism and jihad within western countries.
If you wish to go further, you may wish to consider methods to peacefully regain Islamic areas, i.e. to re-establish Western freedoms and values within western Islamic enclaves in ways which don’t involve awful violence or persecution. Especially if, as looks likely, the division between Muslim and European in Europe boils over into terrible ethnic conflict. I think western freedoms can be re-established in a relatively orderly way through voluntary repurchase of land and properties in and around Islamic enclaves. This is more possible if muslim areas get poorer when western state provision breaks down, whilst commercially-minded European areas rise in prosperity once freed of the burden of the taxman.
“Now one day someone from the Shariah part of town decides that he no longer wants to be Muslim. He flees to join the "free" part of town and agrees to live by their code. Soon his former brethens demand that he be returned failing which its war. So codes or laws are necessary tied to a specific geographic area where its laws can be applied by force if necessary.”
You will see from my comments above that I agree with your comments about geography. Also that the type of disagreement you describe here is foreseeable.
I think the point you are making is that orderly force cannot be deployed other than by the state and that, therefore, my system requires a state authority in order to be able to defend itself by force.
First, one look at Europe’s bloodsoaked history will tell you that eye-watering violence is not the sole preserve of state institutions.
Second, if your point is that the state employs force in an orderly way, then my response is that European state authorities have more commonly employed violence in vicious and disorderly ways, and that this will be the tendency as democracy breaks down and tribalism rises in Europe.
Third, my system will be easy to defend against potential enemies because, being tax-free, it will attract a lot of investment quickly, and rich investors will be hard on threats against their investments – it’s cheaper than paying tax. And the enemies ranged up against them (gangsters, bankrupt dictators, rump parliaments) won’t be so imtimidating, and will have much less to gain by invading than depositors have to gain by keeping the system going. Rich societies have a defining material advantage – see the Union victory over the Confederacy, largely for economic and logistical reasons, despite equal Confederacy generalship; see also Nazi Germany’s inability to resist America’s material advantage in World War II. Ordered societies are generally much better at deploying organised force than gangs, bankrupt dictators, rump parliaments.
Fourth, even if a self-government region got invaded, it would become poor. I.e. the material temptation would be lost to a potential invader.
Fifth, effective codes would almost certainly require a contribution to a recognized defence organisation. Either a financial contribution, or a contribution in military service. Self-government areas will be attractive to residents because they are so prosperous. If a self-government area is vulnerable to invasion, its attractiveness to investors, and therefore its prosperity, is reduced. So that the codes which survive financially and physically, and which get the most members, will be the ones which make such a requirement. And this is quite foreseeable. Thus forcing codes to make such a requirement in anticipation, or in obedience to the stock markets if nothing else!
Sixth, there is the possibility of voluntary mutual defence organisations for members to contribute to the defence of hearth and home. Before you laugh at such a suggestion, or suggest that no one in their right mind would voluntarily join up, I invite you to look at the rush to enlist at the outbreak of the American Civil War, particularly the way Southern males were motivated by the idea of defending home, and the influence this had on Northern or strategy. Or you could look at the number of British volunteers during World War I, and the general resilience of their motivation despite appalling conditions.
http://www.anti-state.com/article.php?article_id=336 and http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/forep/forep007.pdf have some OK-ish ideas on this issue if you’re really interested.
I think that history shows the defence of home to be a natural and involuntary instinct, and that the problem, if anything, is not the lack of that drive, but the excess of it. I think this will be painfully apparent as the division between Islamic and ethnic-European populations deepens and hardens.
I also think history shows that socialist states are extremely inefficient at deploying force – see the Soviet Union, or today’s European military. Even the American military, for all its might, has been compared to a brontosaurus, i.e. a huge beast with a relatively small business end!
And, in respect of your example, Islamic states have, for a long time been bad at war. Google “why Arabs lose wars” for a number of well-research explanations.
Seventh, my system could hardly do worse than the current European states, whose militaries seem barely to function. It is certainly unrealistic to expect the ordered application of state force to survive the breakdown of those state authorities.
“And each territory needs a centralized authority to arrange for its common defence and to enforce its laws within its borders.”
Again, we seem to return to your inability to conceive of anyone other than a state carrying out a long list of functions. We can now add the military to your list!
But thanks again for your reply, Ohmyrus. You’re a good guy and I do appreciate and value it!
Best wishes,
Hal
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